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KEY DISTRIBUTION USING GRAPHS FOR SECRET SHARING
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Abstract. Key distribution for secret sharing is the core important aspect of any secure
cryptosystem, the threshold scheme enables a secret key to be shared among p members
in which each member holds a part of the secret key. In recent years, many works have
been done on constructing (t + 1, l) threshold schemes using different algebraic aspects
of the mathematics. In this paper, we discuss certain aspects of key sharing using Graph
Theory and Strongly co-prime integers to present techniques which manage the sharing
of keys equally amongst the users keeping the security of the system intact.
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1. Introduction
A cryptosystem consists of an encryption/decryption algorithm and a key. The algo-
rithm, along with the key, encrypts the message M to get the encrypted text Enc(M).
In order to secure the cryptosystem, the sharing of the secret keys needs to safe guarded.
Secret sharing/key distribution is the procedure of assigning a secret amongst a class, each
of whom is given a share of the secret. When different types of shares are merged together
then only the secret can be retrieved; individual shares are of no use on their own.
In 1979, Blakley suggested an idea of Key Sharing using the concept of Guarding
Keys [4]. Shamir later presented a secret sharing scheme based on Lagrange’s polyno-
mial interpolation [1]. The Chinese Remainder Theorem has been used widely in secret
sharing schemes, Mignotte Scheme [8], Asmuth-Bloom Scheme use the threshold key shar-
ing technique where the secret are created by reduction modulo the integers [2]. Tao
Feng, Jiaqi Guo proposed a new access control model which uses Linear Secret Sharing
Scheme [12]. Sorin Iftene also proposed a secret sharing scheme using the CRT with its
application in multi-authority key sharing scheme [11].
Key management deals with the generation, exchange, storage, and application of keys.
The Key Exchange protocols should mantain the following compliance domains [5]:
1. Confidentiality - The secret key should be accesible only to the authorised user.
2. Integrity - The code of the key should not be altered by some third person.
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3. Availability - The key should be available for use at the required time, that is, some
malicious user must not be able to destroy the key.
Keys are the most crucial asset for any cryptosystem, and hence are prone to many
cyber attacks. A side channel leak or a human error (like social hacking) may lead to the
destruction of the whole cryptosystem, leading the organisation’s data to a breach. In
order to add another layer of security, the keys are usually stored in pieces, the procedure
to store the keys in such a manner is called threshold scheme.
1.1. Threshold Scheme. When storing the encryption key, one must decide on between
keeping a single copy of the key in one location for maximum secrecy or keeping multiple
copies of the key in different locations for greater reliability. Raising genuineness or au-
thenticity of the key by storing numerous replicas at various positions lowers secrecy by
providing more chances for a copy to fall into the wrong hands. Secret sharing strategy
deals with this issue, and allows effective secrecy and authenticity to be attained. A secure
secret sharing strategy assigns t− shares so that any person with (t− 1)− shares has no
additional knowledge about the secret than someone with 0− shares.
If a person with (t−1)−shares is able to lower the problem of attaining the inner secret
without first needing to recover all of the significant portions, the network is not secure
enough. More generally, (n, k) secret sharing is the problem of distributing the secret key
S among n people so that no k-1 of them have any information about S but k of them
can determine S [6, 7].
For record, we would like to mention the Chinese Remainder Theorem
Theorem 1.1 (CRT) Suppose thatm1,m2, ...,mr are pairwise relatively prime positive
integers, and let a1, a2, ..., ar be integers. Then the system of congruences, x ≡ ai(modmi))
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, has a unique solution modulo M = m1 × m2 × ... × mr, which is
given by: x ≡ a1M1y1 + a2M2y2 + ... + arMryr(mod M) , where Mi = M/mi and
yi ≡ (Mi)−1(mod mi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
2. Key Sharing Using Mutually Co-Prime Integers
One of the major challanges in the key management system is related to the scalability
of the system. A large number of encryption keys with a support system running among
multiple databases might consume a lot of space in the network and hence time.
The proposed system involves a design of pre-distribution algorithm using a deter-
ministic approach. This algorithm uses Graph Theory and Number Theory with high
connectivity, high resilience and memory requirement.
Theorem 2.1 Consider three very large mutually co-prime positive integers a, b, c such
that
aφ(b) + bφ(a) 6≡ 0(mod c)
aφ(c) + cφ(a) 6≡ 0(mod b)
bφ(c) + cφ(b) 6≡ 0(mod a)
Let S be the given secret and N = abc where a, b and c are mutually co-prime positive
integers and φ is the Euler’s Phi Function. Define three secret shareholders Y1, Y2, Y3 as
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follows:
Y1 ≡ (−Sk1a(bφ(c) + cφ(b)))(mod N)




φ(b) + bφ(a)) + 1
]
)(mod N)
then S = Y1 + Y2 + Y3(mod N)
Theorem 2.2 Let a, b, c, d are mutually co-prime positive integers. Then there exist
integers k1, k2, k3, k4 such that
k1a
[













aφ(bc) + bφ(ac) + cφ(ab)
]
+ 6 ≡ 0(mod abcd)
Proof
Define X = bφ(cd) + cφ(bd) + dφ(bc) + aφ(cd) + cφ(ad) + dφ(ac) + aφ(bd) + bφ(ad) + dφ(ab) +
aφ(bc) + bφ(ac) + cφ(ab) − 6
X ≡ bφ(cd) + cφ(bd) + dφ(bc)(mod a)
X ≡ aφ(cd) + cφ(ad) + dφ(ac)(mod b)
X ≡ aφ(bd) + bφ(ad) + dφ(ab)(mod c)
X ≡ aφ(bc) + bφ(ac) + cφ(ab)(mod d)
By the CRT, we have




φ(bc) + bφ(ac) + cφ(ab))MdM
′
d
Therefore, there exist integers k1, k2, k3, k4 such that
k1a(b
φ(cd) + cφ(bd) + dφ(bc)) + k2b(a
φ(cd) + cφ(ad) + dφ(ac)) + k3c(a
φ(bd) + bφ(ad) + dφ(ab)) +
k4d(a
φ(bc) + bφ(ac) + cφ(ab)) + 6 ≡ 0(mod abcd)
The theorems can be generalised to the following lemmas
Lemma 2.1 Let S be the given secret and N = pqr where p, q, r are distinct large
prime numbers. Define three secret shareholders Y1, Y2, Y3 as:
Y1 ≡ (−Sk1p(qφ(r−1)+rφ(q−1)))(mod N), Y2 ≡ (−Sk2q(pφ(r−1)+rφ(p−1)))(mod N), Y3 ≡
(−Sk3r(pφ(q−1) + qφ(p−1)))(mod N) then S = Y1 + Y2 + Y3(mod N)
Lemma 2.2 Let p, q and r be the three given distinct odd primes. Then there exist
integers k1, k2, k3 such that:
k1p(q
r−1 + rq−1) + k2q(p
r−1 + rp−1) + k3r(p
q−1 + qp−1) + 2 ≡ 0(mod pqr)
Theorem 2.3 For any positive integer k ≥ 2, there exist k + k(k−1)2 share holders,
sharing the common secret S.
[10]
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3. Key Sharing using Graph Theory
N. Chandramowliswaran et al [9] presented a technique to manage this situation using
a Peterson Graph. Here, we extend the scheme to implement on Asymmetric Graph
with 25 vertices [3].
Asymmetric Graph is an undirected graph which has no non-trivial symmetries.
1. Consider a graph G, where the vertices represent the keys and the edges represent
users of the network.
If 2 users share a common key, they are called conflict users, otherwise non-conflict
users.
2. Define
V (G) = {Vi = Keyi : 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
E(G) = {k = user − k : 1 ≤ k ≤ n}
where m and n are the total number of keys and users respectively.
3. Define f (vi) = f (Keyi) = σ(i) where σ is a permutation on the set of numbers
{1, 2, ...,m}. This σ(i) is given for each Keyi
4. Now define the graceful labelling g on the set {σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(m)}
g : {σ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} → {0, 1, 2, ..., q − 1, q}
Suppose g[userj] = |g(σ(r))− g(σ(s))| ∈ {1, 2, ..., q}
g is kept secret, but g[userj] is given for each user j
Entire network is also kept secret.
5. Define
P : V (G)→ {p1, p2, ..., pi} where pi are distinct odd primes.
ej : gcd(ej , (pr − 1), (ps − 1)) = 1
mj ≡ (g [user − j])ej (modprps)
P, ej are kept secret.
6. Decompose the user (edges) into subset of Non Conflict users (set of Independent
Edges) and hence define the congruence equations for the sets.
7. The solution of the congruence relations (via Chinese Remainder Theorem) would
be the common secret shared by the each set of non conflict users.
3.1. Asymmetric Graph. We take an undirected graph with 25 vertices and 42 edges.
It has odd number of vertices, therefore we cannot obtain a perfect matching or 1-factor
for this graph because perfect matching is a graph containing n/2 edges where n is the no.
of vertices. Now, we are using this graph as a network where the nodes are the keys and
the edges are the users. For each vertex, we assign a large prime number p1, p2, p3, ..., p25
and for edges we are using numbers i.e. 1, 2, 3, ..., 42.
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1. Given system has 25 keys and 42 users. Every user can use at most two keys. Here
the distribution is not symmetric i.e. some keys are used by 5 users, some are used by 4
users and some are used by 3 users. Represent the Keys by the nodes (vertices) of the
graph G and users by the edges.
2. Set of non-conflict users
M1 = {user1, user3, user5, user7, user9, user11, user28, user31, user34}
M2 = {user2, user4, user6, user8, user10, user12, user29, user32, user35}
M3 = {user13, user15, user17, user18, user20, user22, user23, user25}
M4 = {user16, user21, user30, user33, user36}
M5 = {user14, user19, user24, user37}
M6 = {user38, user40}
M7 = {user39, user42}
M8 = {user26, user41}
3. Define
V (G) = {Vi = Keyi : 1 ≤ i ≤ 25}
E(G) = {k = user − k : 1 ≤ k ≤ 42}
f (vi) = f (Keyi) = σ(i) where σ is a permutation on the set of numbers {1, 2, ..., 25}.
For each Key we have a different σ(i) This σ(i) is given for each Keyi
4. Let g(userk) = |g(σ(r)) − g(σ(s))| ∈ {1, 2, ..., q}, where 1 ≤ r, s ≤ 25, r 6= s be the
graceful labeling on the set {σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(25)}.
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5. For each user, we define g(userk) such that g : E(G) → {1, 2, ..., q} which is kept
confidential.
g(userk) is the user id, user k has two keys i.e σ(r), σ(s) and the entire network is kept
secret.
6. P : V (G) → {p1, p2, ..., p25} where pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 25 are distinct large odd primes with
with q < min(pi), q < pk for all k(1 ≤ k ≤ 42).
7. Let us assume a prime ek such that gcd(ek, (pr−1), (ps−1)) andmk ≡ (g [user − k])ek(mod prps)
P (Keyr) = pr, P (Keys) = ps.










Now, defining the congruence equations for M1
A ≡ n1(mod p1p2)
A ≡ n3(mod p3p4)
A ≡ n5(mod p5p6)
A ≡ n7(mod p7p8)
A ≡ n9(mod p9p10)
A ≡ n11(mod p11p12)
A ≡ n28(mod p13p14)
A ≡ n31(mod p16p17)
A ≡ n34(mod p19p20)
Now, we can say (using the Chinese Remainder Theorem) that, A has a distinct solution
(mod (p1 · p2...p20)).
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user35↔ {Key17,Key18}
Defining the congruence equations for M2
B ≡ n2(mod p2p3)
B ≡ n4(mod p4p5)
B ≡ n6(mod p6p7)
B ≡ n8(mod p8p9)
B ≡ n10(mod p10p11)
B ≡ n12(mod p12p1)
B ≡ n29(mod p20p21)
B ≡ n32(mod p14p15)
B ≡ n35(mod p17p18)
B has a distinct solution (mod (p1 · p2...p21)).











Defining congruence equations for M3
C ≡ n13(mod p12p13)
C ≡ n15(mod p2p14)
C ≡ n17(mod p3p23)
C ≡ n18(mod p4p16)
C ≡ n20(mod p6p17)
C ≡ n22(mod p7p24)
C ≡ n23(mod p8p19)
C ≡ n25(mod p10p20)
C ≡ n27(mod p11p22)
C has a distinct solution (mod (p2 · p3 · p4 · p6 · p7 · p8 · p10 · p11 · p12 · p13 · p14 · p16 · p17 ·
p19 · p20 · p22 · p23 · p24)).








Defining congruence equations for M4
D ≡ n16(mod p22p3)
D ≡ n21(mod p7p23)
D ≡ n30(mod p15p16)
D ≡ n33(mod p18p19)
D ≡ n36(mod p21p13)
D has a distinct solution (mod (p3 · p7 · p13 · p15 · p16 · p18 · p19 · p21 · p22 · p23))






Defining congruence equations for M5
E ≡ n14(mod p1p22)
E ≡ n19(mod p5p23)
E ≡ n24(mod p9p24)
E ≡ n37(mod p21p25)
E has a distinct solution (mod (p1 · p5 · p9 · p21 · p22 · p23 · p24 · p25))




Defining congruence equations for M6
F ≡ n38(mod p15p25)
F ≡ n40(mod p22p24)
F has a distinct solution (mod (p15 · p22 · p24 · p25))
Therefore, M6 non conflict users share the common secret F .
For M7
user39↔ {Key18,Key25}
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user42↔ {Key23,Key24}
Defining congruence equations for M6
G ≡ n39(mod p18p25)
G ≡ n40(mod p23p24)
G has a distinct solution (mod (p18 · p23 · p24 · p25))




Defining congruence equations for M8
H ≡ n26(mod p11p24)
H ≡ n41(mod p22p23)
H has a distinct solution (mod (p11 · p22 · p23 · p24))
Therefore, M8 non conflict users share the common secret H.
4. Secret Sharing using Strongly co-prime integers and CRT
We also use certain theorems based on strongly co-prime integers. A pair of co-prime
positive integers m,n is said to be strongly φ co-prime if:
gcd(m,n) = gcd(m,φ(n)) = gcd(φ(m), n) = 1
Where φ(x) is Euler’s Totient Function. It is defined as the number of positive integers
≤ x that are relatively prime to x.
Lemma: Let p, q, r be three given distinct odd primes. Assume p, q, r to be mutually
strongly co-prime. Then, there exist integers k1, k2, k3 such that k1p
[









(p− 1)q−1 + (q − 1)p−1
]
+ 4 ≡ 0(mod pqr)
Proof: Consider three VERY LARGE odd primes p, q, r with p < q < r. Now, we
require that they must be strongly co-prime.
gcd(p, φ(q)) = 1 (1)
gcd(φ(p), q) = 1 (2)
gcd(p, φ(r)) = 1 (3)
gcd(φ(p), r) = 1 (4)
gcd(q, φ(r)) = 1 (5)
gcd(φ(q), r) = 1 (6)
The conditions 2, 4 & 6 say that
gcd(p− 1, q) = gcd(p− 1, r) = gcd(q − 1, r) = 1
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The condition is valid since p < q < r
Now, the conditions 1, 3 & 5 say that
gcd(p, q − 1) = gcd(p, r − 1) = gcd(q, r − 1) = 1
This is equivalently
r 6≡ 1(mod q)
r 6≡ 1(mod p)
q 6≡ 1(mod p)
Define Y = (p− 1)q−1 + (q− 1)p−1 + (p− 1)r−1 + (r− 1)p−1 + (q− 1)r−1 + (r− 1)q−1− 4
Since q 6≡ 1(mod p), we have (q − 1)p−1 ≡ 1(mod p).
Since r 6≡ 1(mod p), we have (r − 1)p−1 ≡ 1(mod p).
Since q, r are odd primes, we have (p− 1)q−1 ≡ 1(mod p), (p− 1)r−1 ≡ 1(mod p)
Therefore Y ≡ (q − 1)r−1 + (r − 1)q−1(mod p)
Similarly Y ≡ (r − 1)p−1 + (p− 1)r−1(mod q)
Y ≡ (p− 1)q−1 + (q − 1)p−1(mod r)
Now, we apply the Chinese Remainder Theorem for the above mentioned simultaneous
congruences. We have a unique solution for Y (mod pqr)
Define M = pqr
Mp = M/p = qr
Mq = M/q = pr
Mr = M/r = pq
Since, gcd(Mp, p) = 1, there is a unique M
′
p such that MpM
′
p ≡ (mod p)
Similarly, MqM
′
q ≡ (mod q)
and, MrM
′
r ≡ (mod r)
Now, by the CRT we must have
Y ≡
[
















So, we can say that
Y =
[








(q − 1)r−1 + (r − 1)q−1
]
− 4 ≡ Y ≡
[



































r − 1)(mod pqr)
Now,
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MpM
′
p = k1p for some integer k1
MqM
′
q = k2q for some integer k2
MrM
′












(p− 1)q−1 + (q − 1)p−1
]
+
4 ≡ 0(mod pqr)
Now, we set up the Secret Sharing Scheme with the following setup:
Step 1.
Choose p, q, r(p < q < r) VERY LARGE odd primes and keep them private.
Step 2.
p, q, r are stronlgy co-prime.
Step 3.
(q − 1)r−1 + (r − 1)q−1 6≡ 0(mod p)
(q − 1)r−1 + (r − 1)q−1 6≡ 0(mod p)
(q − 1)r−1 + (r − 1)q−1 6≡ 0(mod p)
Step 4.
Set N = pqr
In this type of Secret Key Sharing, we use Factorization Difficulty and Discrete Log
Difficulty
1. Let S be the given secret.





















Now, S = Y1 + Y2 + Y3
5. Conclusion and Future Work
The proposed scheme focuses on securing the key(s) broadcasted amongst the users
and guarantees the authentication. The protocol is secure for both internal and exter-
nal attacks. The technique used in this paper for secret sharing is to split the secret
amongst a network of users and send it to the participating share holders in the network.
Also, it is not able to decode the secret without the knowledge of all shares and any
attacker cannot identify if any one share is missing. Hence forth one can use it for vari-
ous network protocols. The techniques use analytical discrete mathematics amalgamated
with theoretical computer science in order to achieve high order space-time compatibility.
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The technique can be extended to the development of new algorithms based on the de-
composition of vertices.
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